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According to economic theories, preference for one
item over others reveals its rank value on a common
scale. Previous studies identified brain regions
encoding such values. Here we verify that these
regions can valuate various categories of objects and
further test whether they still express preferences
when attention is diverted to another task. During
functional neuroimaging, participants rated either
the pleasantness (explicit task) or the age (distractive
task) of pictures from different categories (face,
house, and painting). After scanning, the same
pictures were presented in pairs, and subjects had
to choose the one they preferred. We isolated brain
regions that reflect both values (pleasantness ratings)
and preferences (binary choices). Preferences were
encoded whatever the stimulus (face, house, or
painting) and task (explicit or distractive). These
regions may therefore constitute a brain system that
automatically engages in valuating the various
components of our environment so as to influence
our future choices.
INTRODUCTION
In classical economic theory (Samuelson, 1938; Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944), preferences revealed in binary choices
are used to rank the value of different options on a common
scale: choosing option A over option B means that Value(A) is
greater than Value(B). This theory suggests the existence of a
brain system that encodes the values underlying revealed prefer-
ences (Rangel et al., 2008). A further question is whether the
brain engages in value judgment under all circumstances or
only when a choice is to be made (Seymour and McClure,
2008). Neural correlates of both value judgments and choices/
preferences have been largely investigated but mostly in sepa-
rate studies. Interestingly, regions comprising the limbic fronto-
striatal circuits have been implicated in both valuation and
choice tasks (Hare et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2007; Knutson et al.,
2007; McClure et al., 2004b; Paulus and Frank, 2003; Plassmannet al., 2008). These regions include the ventral striatum (VS) and
its main inputs, namely the ventral prefrontal cortex, amygdala,
and hippocampus (Alexander et al., 1986; Brown and Pluck,
2000; Haber, 2003). More precisely, activity in these regions
has been found to reflect values in a parametric manner, both
when subjects were asked to rate how much they liked visual
items and when they were instructed to choose a preferred
item from a pair. However, it is unclear whether these value-
related activations emerge naturally or if they are artificially eli-
cited by the instructions given to subjects. In other words, the
question is whether the same regions also encode values
when it is not relevant for the ongoing task, i.e., when subjects
are engaged in a distractive task. The aim of the present func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study was to identify
such an automatic valuation system in the human brain.
We investigated value encoding in a noneconomic context,
with the hypothesis that the same regions would be involved
as in economic situations, for instance when choosing whether
or not to purchase a good. A requisite for a brain valuation
system (BVS) is to reflect both values, as explicitly reported by
subjects, and preferences, as revealed in binary choices. We
imposed the constraint that value and preference encoding
should be generic, in accordance to the common neural
currency hypothesis, which assumes that a same brain system
can appraise options associated with different categories of
pleasurable experiences (Montague and Berns, 2002). Various
categories of visual stimuli, such as food, faces, paintings, sculp-
tures, scenic views, or vacation projects have been explored to
date (Di Dio et al., 2007; Kawabata and Zeki, 2004; O’Doherty
et al., 2003; Plassmann et al., 2007; Sharot et al., 2009; Yue
et al., 2007), but these categories have not been compared in
a single experimental design. In the present study, we varied
the category of the stimuli presented by including pictures of
faces, houses, and paintings. The pictures were chosen so as
to allow considerable intersubject variability in expressed prefer-
ences, such that the underlying valuation system would reflect
personal taste and not commonalities. The pictures were dis-
played one by one in the MRI scanner and subjects had to rate
either their pleasantness (explicit task) or their age (distractive
task) on an analog scale (Figure 1). After the scanning sessions,
the same pictures were presented in pairs, and subjects had to
choose the one they preferred. We then searched for those brain
regions that encoded both values and preferences, acrossNeuron 64, 431–439, November 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 431
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Figure 1. Tasks Overview
Age rating (A) and pleasantness rating (B) tasks were performed during scanning, whereas choice task (C) was conducted after scanning. Successive screen-
shots displayed during a given trial are illustrated from left to right, with durations in milliseconds. In the rating tasks, subjects had to move a cursor on an analog
scale to indicate the age or the pleasantness of a picture, which could be a face, house, or painting. In the choice task, subjects had to state which picture they
preferred between two of those in the same category (face, house, or painting).subjects and regardless of task and category. These brain
regions would hence constitute a valuation system that is both
generic and automatic.
RESULTS
Behavior
We conducted several analyses to establish the validity of the
experimental design. First, to verify that age and pleasantness
are orthogonal dimensions of our stimuli, we corroborated that
there was no correlation between age and pleasantness ratings
(r = 0.049, p = 0.35), thus discarding the possibility that age
ratings may be linked to affective values. Pleasantness ratings
were neutral on average (0.56 ± 2.51) but extended over
a wide range along the scale (Figure 2A). The interstimuli stan-
dard deviation (2.51) was similar to the intersubject one (2.78),
indicating that, as each subject used a large range of values to
rate the different stimuli, a same stimulus was variably rated by
the different subjects. The variability was smaller for the age
ratings (interstimuli SD: 1.32, intersubjects SD: 1.35), probably
because this is a more objective dimension.
Next, we verified that preferences were not shared between
subjects, but revealed personal tastes. To this aim the compar-
isons were fixed in the choice task: all subjects were presented
with the same pairs of pictures. Each picture was presented
once in an easy comparison and once in a hard comparison,
making a total of 180 easy and 180 hard comparisons for all
360 pictures (120 pictures per category). Easy and hard compar-
isons were generated from the average picture rankings ob-
tained in a pilot study. In the easy comparisons, the pictures to
be compared had an adjacent position in the ranking, whereas
in the hard comparisons they were 60 positions apart (the one
half mark of the ranking for a given category). The median agree-
ment rate (proportion of subjects choosing the same picture)432 Neuron 64, 431–439, November 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.was 60%–65% for hard comparisons and 70%–75% for easy
comparisons (Figure 2B). In other words, among the 20 subjects,
12 or 13 chose one picture and 7 or 8 chose the other in a typical
hard comparison (14 or 15 and 5 or 6 for an easy comparison,
respectively). Thus, preferences were not trivially driven by the
stimuli, as different subjects made different choices.
Last, in keeping with the hypothesis that pleasantness ratings
and preferences are based on the same underlying values, we
checked the relationship between the two measures. Prediction
scores (proportion of cases where subjects chose A after rating
A as greater than B) were 74.7% ± 1.6% for easy comparisons
and 68.9% ± 1.4% for hard comparisons. For the 17 subjects
who returned 1 month later to repeat the choice task, prediction
scores were unchanged: 74.2% ± 1.5% (easy comparisons) and
67.2% ± 1.9% (hard comparisons). Moreover, preferences were
found to be relatively stable, as 76.1% ± 1.5% of easy and
71.8% ± 1.7% of hard comparisons elicited the same choice
on the immediate (just after scanning) and the delayed (1 month
later) choice tasks. All prediction scores were significantly (p <
0.01) above chance level (50%) whatever the delay and com-
parison, establishing a link between pleasantness ratings and
preferences (Figure 2C). This link was further confirmed by
calculating the average difference in rating between the
preferred and nonpreferred pictures (Figure 2D), which was
also significant for the two delays and difficulty levels (all p <
0.001). As expected, this difference was higher for easy relative
to hard comparisons (immediate session: +0.94 ± 0.17, t19 =
5.66; delayed session: +1.00 ± 0.15, t16 = 6.47, both p <
0.001). Thus, through introspection, subjects accessed explicit
values that were tightly linked to their preferences, even when
assessed after a 1 month delay.
The link between pleasantness ratings and preferences could
also be inferred from decision times. An intuitive rule is that
decisions take longer if alternatives have closer values
Neuron
Automatic Valuation in the Human Brain(FitzGerald et al., 2009), as seen with conflict effects in percep-
tual decision-making (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). We reasoned
that the difference in pleasantness ratings (dV), between
preferred and nonpreferred pictures (P  NP), should predict
response times (RTs) in the choice task. To test this hypothesis,
z-scored pleasantness ratings were ranked and divided into 10
subsets of ascending dV for each individual. Correlations with
RT were calculated over these 10 data points and tested for
significance across subjects. The correlation between dV and
RT (Figure 2D) was significant for both the immediate and
delayed sessions (immediate: R = 0.49 ± 0.09, t19 = 5.73;
delayed: R = 0.41 ± 0.09, t16 = 4.57; both p < 0.001). This
suggests that the uncertainty of preferences was expressed
as both smaller dV and longer RT. Note that this relation did
not hold when preferences contradicted pleasantness ratings
(for negative dV).
Neuroimaging
A prerequisite for further examination of the BVS was to verify
that the different stimuli categories (face, house, and painting)
and the different behavioral tasks (pleasantness and age ratings)
activate different brain areas. We first contrasted each stimulus
category with the two others, at the time of picture viewing.
Consistent with previous studies (Grill-Spector and Malach,
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Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A) Correlation between age and pleasantness
ratings. The dots correspond to the 360 pictures.
Ratings were averaged across the 20 subjects.
The black line indicates linear regression fit.
(B) Distribution of agreement rates over the 180
hard and 180 easy comparisons. Plots show the
number of stimuli pairs for which a specific
percentage of subjects expressed the same pref-
erence.
(C) Prediction scores (percentage of pairs for
which the preferred picture got the higher pleas-
antness rating), averaged separately for easy and
hard comparisons, and for both the immediate
and delayed choice task sessions.
(D) Difference in pleasantness ratings (dV)
between preferred and nonpreferred pictures
(P  NP), averaged separately for easy and hard
comparisons, in both the immediate and delayed
choice task sessions.
(E) Correlation between response times and
z-scored dV in immediate (left) and delayed (right)
choice tasks. The dots represent 18 comparisons,
ranked according to dV and averaged across
subjects.
Error bars represent intersubject SEM. (*), signifi-
cant difference between conditions in black (p <
0.01, two-tailed paired t test) or from chance in
white (p < 0.001, one-tailed paired t test).
2004; Reddy and Kanwisher, 2006), we
found significantly different activations
in a variety of brain regions (Figure 3): in
the occipital cortex (primary and associa-
tive visual areas), in the parietal cortex
(precuneus and supramarginal gyrus), in
the temporal cortex (fusiform, lingual, and para-hippocampal
gyri), in the amygdala, and in the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC). Thus, the different categories of stimuli matched the func-
tional specialization of different brain regions, mostly in the
ventral and dorsal visual streams.
We next contrasted expression patterns for pleasantness
versus age ratings, after z-scoring within each subject, task,
and category. This contrast was meant to isolate regions that
specifically encode subjective values, independent of processes
that would be common to age estimation, such as assigning
a number to a picture or moving a cursor along a scale. Signifi-
cant activations (Figure 4A) were seen in a large cluster with
main maxima located in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), ACC, VS, amygdala, hippo-
campus, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and primary visual
cortex (V1). Apart from these last two regions, the neural network
encoding subjective values appeared to match the limbic fronto-
striatal circuits as described in anatomical studies (Haber, 2003).
The two dimensions to be rated in the different tasks (age and
pleasantness) thus yielded significantly different activations.
There was no activation in the reverse contrast (age versus
pleasantness ratings), suggesting that the brain has no general
system dedicated to age estimation, or at least not for the
wide range of ages (from years to centuries) tested here.Neuron 64, 431–439, November 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 433
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Automatic Valuation in the Human BrainOur definition of the BVS included both parametric encoding of
subjective values and prediction of preferences in choice tasks.
We thus performed a formal conjunction between the above
contrast (pleasantness versus age ratings) and a PNP contrast.
Whether a picture was preferred or not was derived from the indi-
vidual preferences expressed during the postscan choice task
that assessed easy comparisons, and was thus unique for each
subject. From this conjunction the list of activated regions was
restricted to the VMPFC, VS, hippocampus, PCC, and V1
(Figure 4B). Although V1 activation is an interesting example of
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Axial glass brain Sagittal slice Frontal slice Figure 3. Statistical Parametric Maps of
Stimulus Category
Each category (face, house, painting) was con-
trasted with the two others at the individual level.
Slices were taken at maxima of interest indicated
by red pointers on glass brains. Areas shown in
gray/black on glass brains and in red/yellow on
coronal slices showed significant group level
random effect (one-sample t test, p < 0.001,
uncorrected). [x y z] coordinates of the maxima
refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute space.
Color scales on the right indicate t values.
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Axial glass brain Sagittal slice Frontal slice Figure 4. Statistical Parametric Maps of
Values and Preferences
(Top) Correlation with pleasantness ratings.
(Bottom) conjunction between pleasantness rating
(above contrast) and preference contrast
(preferred minus nonpreferred pictures). The
bottom map was used to identify regions com-
prising the brain valuation system (BVS). Slices
were taken at maxima of interest indicated by red
pointers on glass brains. Areas shown in gray/
black on glass brains and in red/yellow on coronal
slices showed significant group level random
effect (one-sample t test, p < 0.001, uncorrected).
[x y z] coordinates of the maxima refer to the Mon-
treal Neurological Institute space. Color scales on
the right indicate t values.
top-down modulation of early sensory
areas, we excluded V1 as probably too
specific to the visual nature of our stimuli,
andhence less likely tobepartofageneric
valuation system. The BVS that will be
further characterized below therefore
includes the VMPFC, VS, hippocampus,
and PCC. Note that these regions corre-
spond to the clusters activated in the
simple contrast between preferred and
nonpreferred pictures, which played
a limiting role in the conjunction.
The blood oxygen-level dependant
(BOLD) signal was deconvolved by fitting
a canonical hemodynamic response to every single trial, at the
time of picture viewing. The response magnitudes (betas) to all
pictures were extracted from spheres centered on the different
BVS regions. We analyzed these response magnitudes in rela-
tion to pleasantness ratings and preferences. As seen above
with RT, correlations between response magnitudes and pleas-
antness ratings were calculated over 10 data points and tested
for significance across subjects (Figure 5). The correlation was
highly significant in the VMPFC (R = 0.40 ± 0.06, t19 = 6.23, p <
0.001), VS (R = 0.24 ± 0.05, t19 = 4.89, p < 0.001) and434 Neuron 64, 431–439, November 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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Figure 5. Value Encoding in the Brain Valuation System
Regression coefficients (betas) were extracted in the different brain valuation regions, located at the intersection of blue lines on the sagittal slices. These
coefficients were plotted against z-scored values expressed as pleasantness ratings. The dots represent 18 pictures, ranked in order of ascending values
and averaged across subjects. Error bars represent between-subject SEM.hippocampus (R = 0.28 ± 0.04, t19 = 6.55, p < 0.001), and moder-
ately significant in the PCC (R = 0.14 ± 0.07, t19 = 1.98, p = 0.03).
The P  NP contrasts in the easy comparisons were also esti-
mated separately for the different BVS regions (Figure 6A). The
contrast was highly significant in all regions (VMPFC: +0.27 ±
0.09, t19 = 2.89, p = 0.005; VS: +0.39 ± 0.10, t19 = 3.86, p <
0.001; hippocampus: +0.30 ± 0.07, t19 = 4.11, p < 0.001; and
PCC: +0.19 ± 0.03, t19 = 5.58, p < 0.001).
Of course these last results are not surprising, since the BVS
regions were selected both to encode subjective values reported
as pleasantness ratings and to predict choices in easy compar-
isons. To get an independent estimation of how good these
regions are at encoding preferences, we used the P  NPcontrast in the hard comparisons (Figure 6B). Because there
was no significant difference in preference encoding between
regions (Figure 6B), we pooled them to form a single BVS. This
BVS was significantly more activated by pictures that were later
preferred in the hard comparisons (+0.17 ± 0.04, t19 = 4.75, p <
0.001). We also verified that the same contrast was still signifi-
cant for preferences expressed 1 month later for both easy
comparisons (+0.20 ± 0.07, t16 = 3.01, p < 0.001) and hard
comparisons (+0.10 ± 0.04, t16 = 2.48, p = 0.01).
We now turn to testing the hypothesized features of the BVS:
personal, generic, and automatic. To assess whether the BVS
encodes personal and not shared preferences, the comparisons
were split into two subsets below and above the median0
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Figure 6. Preference Encoding in the Brain
Valuation System
Regression coefficients (betas) were contrasted
between preferred and nonpreferred pictures
(P  NP) in the different brain valuation regions,
separately for the different experimental condi-
tions.
(A) Comparison between brain regions. VMPFC,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex; VS, ventral stria-
tum; H, hippocampus; PCC, posterior cingulate
cortex.
(B) Comparison between choice tasks (easy and
hard comparisons in both immediate and delayed
sessions).
(C) Comparisons between shared and personal
preferences, separated by median agreement
rate.
(D) Comparison between stimulus categories
(face, house, and painting).
(E) Comparison between rating tasks (pleasant-
ness/explicit and age/distractive).
Bars represent mean ± intersubject SEM. (*),
significant difference between conditions in black
(p < 0.05, two-tailed paired t test) or from chance in
white (p < 0.05, one-tailed paired t test).Neuron 64, 431–439, November 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 435
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Automatic Valuation in the Human Brainagreement rate (Figure 6C). Then we tested the P  NP contrast
separately for the two subsets. This contrast was significant for
both the highly personal (+0.24 ± 0.05, t19 = 5.17, p < 0.001;
agreement rate: 58.35% ± 4.98%) and highly shared (+0.21 ±
0.06, t19 = 3.73, p < 0.001; agreement rate: 81.14% ± 8.24%)
preferences, with no difference between personal and shared
preferences (p = 0.70). This shows that when subjects disagree,
the BVS follows the individual and not the average choices. To
assess whether the BVS can generically express preferences
across categories, we tested the P  NP contrast separately for
faces, houses, and paintings (Figure 6D). The contrast was signif-
icant for all categories (faces: +0.31 ± 0.10, t19 = 3.08, p = 0.003;
houses: +0.22 ± 0.09, t19 = 2.45, p = 0.01; paintings: +0.32 ± 0.08,
t19 = 4.07, p < 0.001). There was no difference between cate-
gories (faces versus houses: t19 = 0.70, p = 0.48; faces versus
paintings: t19 = 0.08, p = 0.93; houses versus paintings: t19 =
0.79, p = 0.44), indicating that the BVS can encode preferences
for various types of objects. To assess the automaticity of the
BVS (Figure 6E), we tested the P  NP contrast separately for
the explicit task (pleasantness rating) and the distractive task
(age rating). The contrast was highly significant for both the
explicit task (+0.29 ± 0.08, t19 = 3.74, p < 0.001) and the distrac-
tive task (+0.28 ± 0.06, t19 = 4.83, p < 0.001), with no difference
between the two (t19 = 0.15, p = 0.88). Thus, BVS activation
encodes preferences, even when it is recorded during a task
that does not require assigning subjective values. We checked
whether this effect was driven by subjects who performed the
pleasantness rating first, which might have primed the BVS.
There was a nonsignificant trend (t18 = 1.84, p = 0.08, nonpaired
t test) for a higher effect in these subjects, but crucially, the P 
NP contrast was significant in both subgroups (age rating
first: +0.18 ± 0.07, t9 = 2.56, p = 0.01; pleasantness rating
first: +0.38 ± 0.08, t9 = 4.54, p < 0.001). The BVS was therefore
automatically engaged during the distractive task, even in
subjects who were not aware that they would later have to rate
the stimuli’s pleasantness and state their preference.
DISCUSSION
Our results provide a confirmation of previous studies that char-
acterized limbic fronto-striatal circuits as a valuation system.
These limbic circuits were indentified first by axon tracing in
monkeys (Alexander et al., 1986; Haber, 2003) and then by fiber
tracking in humans (Draganski et al., 2008; Lehericy et al., 2004).
Different functional partitions of these circuits have been
proposed (Brown and Pluck, 2000), with the so-called limbic or
affective circuit generally including the amygdala, hippocampus,
and ventral prefrontal cortex as the main inputs to the ventral-
basal ganglia circuit (VS, ventral pallidum, ventral tegmental
area, and medio-dorsal thalamus). Considerable evidence from
both human and nonhuman species supports the idea that the
limbic circuit is involved in reward processing (Daw and Doya,
2006; Knutson and Cooper, 2005; McClure et al., 2004c; O’Doh-
erty et al., 2007; Padoa-Schioppa, 2007; Rushworth and Beh-
rens, 2008). Here we found that at least three components of
this limbic circuit, the hippocampus, VS, and VMPFC, reflected
subjective values assigned to visual items that are not universal
rewards such as food or money. This finding is consistent with436 Neuron 64, 431–439, November 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.a variety of studies showing that seeing something one likes
produces activations similar to those of universal rewards
(Hare et al., 2009; Kawabata and Zeki, 2004; Kim et al., 2007;
Knutson et al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004b; O’Doherty et al.,
2003; Paulus and Frank, 2003; Yue et al., 2007). A parsimonious
view would attribute to these regions the capacity to valuate all
sorts of objects, with universal rewards forming a particular
subset that score high in everybody. Our BVS also included
the PCC, which may be less expected, as the PCC has been
implicated, together with the hippocampus, in episodic and
autobiographic memory (Beckmann et al., 2009; Sugiura et al.,
2005). It could be speculated that preferred pictures are associ-
ated with the retrieval of personal memories, although PCC acti-
vation is in fact frequently reported in preference studies,
including those comparing monetary options (Di Dio et al.,
2007; FitzGerald et al., 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; McClure
et al., 2004a; Paulus and Frank, 2003; Schiller et al., 2009).
In accordance with classical economic views, our BVS
reflected both the pleasantness ratings of individual objects and
the preferences observed in binary choices. This may not be
surprising, as subjects reliably preferred the picture that they
had rated more highly. The interesting idea here is that deci-
sion-making might be based on values linearly encoded in the
BVS. Accordingly, RTs measured during choice performance
were inversely proportional to the distance between the two
option values, even when measured 1 month later. Our experi-
ment, however, cannot explain how these values are used to
make a binary choice, as we did not acquire brain images during
the choice task. Additional processes are required to reach a
decision, notably the representation of the two option values
(not just one), which could be separated either in time or space.
Then the two option values have to be compared, and the highest
one, selected. Several previous studies have tried to dissociate
regions involved in decision-making from those involved in
encoding values. One attractive possibility is that choice selection
involves more dorsal fronto-striatal circuits, including the caudate
nucleus (FitzGerald et al., 2009; O’Doherty et al., 2004), but this
has not been consistently supported (Chaudhry et al., 2009;
Sharot et al., 2009). Further studies are therefore needed to eluci-
date how values are integrated into decision-making processes.
As the same brain regions are activated by basic universal
rewards and preferred neutral objects, the question arises of
how subjective the BVS is. This question has rarely been ad-
dressed explicitly, although most previous studies implicitly
assume that the BVS represents personal preferences. Here
we formally addressed this question by comparing pictures
that had adjacent values on the group level ranking of pleasant-
ness ratings averaged across subjects. Preference in these hard
comparisons was encoded in BVS activation, as reliably as in
easy comparisons between pictures with distant values. More-
over, encoding was similar for comparisons that elicited per-
sonal or shared preferences (with low and high agreement rate,
respectively). Preference encoding was therefore not driven by
stimuli that were obviously preferable to a majority of individuals.
This makes the BVS a system in which activity depends on the
subject’s and not the stimulus’ individual characteristics, in
keeping with the classical distinction between value-based and
perception-based decisions (Sugrue et al., 2005).
Neuron
Automatic Valuation in the Human BrainTo push this idea further, we also tested whether BVS activa-
tion would depend on the category of presented stimuli. Faces
and houses were chosen because they are known to activate
different regions within the ventral visual stream (Grill-Spector
and Malach, 2004; Reddy and Kanwisher, 2006). Paintings
were added to test whether stimuli that are culturally recent
could be valuated by the same system as faces, the processing
of which may appear much more crucial with respect to biolog-
ical survival. We found that preference encoding in the BVS was
similar for faces, houses, and paintings, despite these categories
activating different regions of the visual system. This might be
another example of cultural recycling of brain systems that
evolved to fulfill more ancestral functions (Dehaene and Cohen,
2007). Accordingly, sophisticated rewards, such as acquiring a
good reputation (Izuma et al., 2008) or giving money to a charity
(Harbaugh et al., 2007), have been found to activate these
regions just as more basic rewards like receiving money (O’Doh-
erty et al., 2001) or food (Plassmann et al., 2007) do. That the
same regions are involved in valuating different categories of
objects is consistent with the common neuronal currency
hypothesis, which proposes an explanation of how the brain
arbitrates between incommensurable options (Montague and
Berns, 2002). This idea is supported by existing literature, as
separate studies using different stimuli (like faces, scenes, paint-
ings, sculptures, or food items) report similar activations in rela-
tion to subjective values (Di Dio et al., 2007; Kawabata and Zeki,
2004; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Plassmann et al., 2007; Yue et al.,
2007).
The main key finding is that a BVS with the above characteris-
tics still generates values even when they are unnecessary for
the task at hand. Indeed, even when subjects were only asked
to estimate the age of faces, houses, or paintings, with no refer-
ence to pleasantness or preference, activity in the BVS was
found to be higher for pictures that were later preferred. Impor-
tantly, we controlled the conditions such that age and pleasant-
ness ratings were not correlated and that the two tasks activated
different brain regions. This finding suggests that the brain auto-
matically engages in assigning affective values to visual objects
in the individual’s surroundings. A similar result was observed in
these same regions (the VS and medial OFC) during binary
choice between faces that had been presented repeatedly
(Kim et al., 2007). Here we extend this observation by showing
that automatic valuation occurs right from the first presentation
of a visual stimulus in a choice-free context, that it reflects not
only binary choice but also appraisal of individual pictures in
a linear fashion, and that it applies not only to faces but also to
other categories such as houses and paintings. These results
were obtained in a noneconomic context, in keeping with the
idea that sophisticated economic choices rely on more basic
valuation systems that evolved before money was invented,
and which are shared with nonhuman species. The automaticity
of BVS activation suggests that values might come first, pro-
viding a basis for subsequent potential choices. Thus value-
based decisions would involve probing the BVS, just as sensory
systems are probed during perception-based decisions. Where
these values arise from is beyond the scope of this study. It is
likely that both evolution and development played a role, though
perhaps their contributions differ for values that are well sharedand those that are more personal. Another implication of BVS
automaticity is that values assigned to objects or persons at first
sight could affect unrelated decisions. Such a mechanism could
account for some deviations from rationality that are well docu-
mented in behavioral economics and psychology (Colman,
2003; Kahneman, 2003; Mellers et al., 1998).
In summary, we have characterized a brain system that
encodes subjective values in a parametric manner during explicit
pleasantness ratings, and that encodes binary choices
expressed 1 month later. This BVS, which includes the VMPFC,
VS, hippocampus, and PCC, appears to be both generic (dealing
with various types of visual objects) and automatic (functioning
when attention is distracted by another task). We do not imply
here that the BVS encodes absolute rather than relative values:
it seems plausible that subjects took the early pictures as refer-
ence points, classically termed anchors (Seymour and McClure,
2008). It also remains uncertain whether the pleasantness ratings
represent cardinal or ordinal values: subjects may have first
ranked each picture relative to the previous ones, and then in-
ferred its position on the scale. However, the fact that the BVS
also showed preference encoding during the distractive task
argues for a more straightforward valuation process. Finally,
choices were not entirely determined by option values, as
some of the preferred pictures had been accorded a lower rating.
Further experiments are needed to examine whether these
preference reversals come from stochastic noise or from some
systematic bias inherent in decision-making processes.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee for Biomedical Research of
the Pitie´-Salpeˆtrie`re Hospital, where the study was conducted. Subjects were
recruited via the Relais d’Information en Sciences Cognitives (RISC) website
and screened for exclusion criteria: age below 18 or above 39, regular use
of drugs or medications, history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, and
contraindications to MRI scanning (pregnancy, claustrophobia, metallic
implants). All subjects gave informed consent prior to partaking in the study.
We scanned 20 subjects: 10 males (aged 22.0 ± 2.7 years) and 10 females
(aged 21.5 ± 3.0 years). Among this group, 17 subjects came back 1 month
after scanning to perform an additional choice task (see below).
Stimuli
We used 120 faces, 120 houses, and 120 paintings, for a total of 360 pictures.
These pictures were selected to cover a large range of ages: 20–50 years for
faces, 0–300 years for houses, and 0–600 years for paintings. Faces were
drawn from the Productive Aging Lab Face Database (Minear and Park, 2004),
specifically the 20- to 50-year-old white subset, and represented different eye
and hair colors as well as both genders. The faces had a neutral facial expres-
sion, to avoid trivial stimuli-driven valuations, as would be obtained for
instance with smiling faces. Houses and paintings were gathered from the
Internet. They were chosen to cover a large variety of styles, such that different
esthetic tastes could be expressed, for example in terms of modern versus
older periods as far back as the Middle Ages. We controlled that size and lumi-
nance were approximately matched between pictures.
In a pilot behavioral study, 10 subjects rated the pleasantness of the 360
pictures. This was primarily done to ensure that both the interstimuli and inter-
subject variances were sufficiently high for linear regressions. These pilot
ratings were also used to select the pictures to be compared during the choice
task. The picture pairs were fixed to allow estimation of intersubject agreement
rate. For all comparisons the two pictures belonged to the same category
(face, house, or painting), and to the same gender for faces. AverageNeuron 64, 431–439, November 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 437
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for each category (120 pictures). In easy comparisons, pictures ranked n were
compared to pictures ranked n+60, whereas in hard comparisons pictures
ranked n were compared to pictures ranked n+1. The 360 stimuli were
randomly assigned to the six scanning sessions, such that each session em-
ployed 60 new stimuli, equally divided between picture categories (20 faces,
20 houses, and 20 paintings).
Tasks
All tasks were programmed on a PC using the Cogent 2000 (Wellcome Depart-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) library of Matlab functions for
stimuli presentation. Choice tasks were performed after scanning sessions,
at the end of the experiment. During scanning, pictures were displayed one
by one and subjects had to rate either their age or their pleasantness. The
age and pleasantness rating tasks, also referred to as the distractive and
explicit tasks, were blocked in separate consecutive sessions. Half of the
subjects (n = 10) performed the three age-rating sessions first, and then
the three pleasantness-rating sessions, whereas the other half (n = 10)
followed the reverse order. This procedure has the advantage of cancelling
out order effects while preserving the possibility of scanning the (distractive)
age rating task before subjects heard about the (explicit) pleasantness rating
and choice tasks. Importantly, subjects were trained on a small set of pictures
that never appeared in the scanner, and only for the task they were to perform
first (age or pleasantness rating). After the third session they were instructed
through earphones that the task would change, and new rules were explained.
At the trial level, a similar rating procedure was implemented for both the
distractive and explicit tasks. The picture was displayed on the screen for
3 s, following a fixation cross (Figure 1). Then appeared the rating scale, grad-
uated between 10 and 10 for pleasantness rating, and for age rating
between 20 and 50 years (faces), 1700 and 2000 (houses), or 1400 and
2000 (paintings). We used the date of construction for houses and the date
of creation for paintings to make the response more intuitive, but we inversed
the ratings during analysis to make them proportional to the age, and hence
comparable with faces. In all cases the scale had 21 steps (10 values on
each side of the center), but only three or four reference graduations were
shown. Subjects could move the cursor by pressing a button with the right
index finger to go left or with the right middle finger to go right. Rating was
self-paced and subjects had to press a button with the left index finger to vali-
date their responses and go to the next trial. The initial position of the cursor
on the scale was randomized to avoid confounding the ratings with the move-
ments they involved. The average duration of rating sessions (n = 60 pictures)
was 6.84 ± 0.61 min. Note because each picture was only displayed once,
subjects rated the age of half the pictures (n = 180), and the pleasantness
of the other half (n = 180).
The choice task was administered twice: for the first time just after scanning
sessions (within the scanner), and for a second time 1 month later (outside the
scanner). Subjects performed the 180 hard comparisons first and then the 180
easy comparisons, each type divided into three blocks of 60 trials. The pictures
selected to be compared were fixed (see above), but the order of presentation
was randomized across subjects. The two pictures were displayed side by
side, following a fixation cross. The relative position of the two pictures on
the screen was also randomized. Subjects were asked to indicate a preference
by pressing one of two buttons corresponding to the left and right stimuli. We
recorded not only choices but also RTs (delays between picture presentation
and button press). Prediction score was 1 if the chosen picture had been rated
as more pleasant, 0.5 if the two pictures had been equally rated, or 0 if the
choice went against the pleasantness ratings (a phenomenon called prefer-
ence reversal). Stability score was 1 (otherwise 0) if the same picture was
chosen in the immediate (just after scanning) and delayed (1 month later)
choice sessions.
Average ratings, RTs, prediction and stability scores, and correlations (Pear-
son’s coefficients) were z-scored at the subject level and tested for signifi-
cance at the group level. Two-tailed paired t tests were used for comparisons
between experimental conditions, and one-tailed paired t tests for compari-
sons against chance level. We considered three significance levels: 0.05,
0.01, and 0.001. All statistical analyses were performed with Matlab Statistical
Toolbox (Matlab R2006b, The MathWorks, Inc., USA).438 Neuron 64, 431–439, November 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.Neuroimaging
T2*-weighted echo planar images (EPIs) were acquired with BOLD contrast on
a 3.0 Tesla magnetic resonance scanner. We employed a tilted plane acquisi-
tion sequence designed to optimize functional sensitivity in the OFC and
medial temporal lobes (Deichmann et al., 2003). To cover the whole brain
with good spatial resolution, we used the following parameters: TR = 2.29 s,
35 slices, 2 mm slice thickness, 1 mm interslice gap. T1-weighted structural
images were also acquired, coregistered with the mean EPI, normalized to
a standard T1 template, and averaged across subjects to allow group level
anatomical localization. EPI data were analyzed in an event-related manner,
within a general linear model (GLM), using the statistical parametric mapping
software SPM5 (Wellcome Trust center for NeuroImaging, London, UK) imple-
mented in Matlab. The first five volumes of each session were discarded to
allow for T1 equilibration effects. Preprocessing consisted of spatial realign-
ment, normalization using the same transformation as structural images, and
spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel with a full-width at half-maximum
(FWHM) of 8 mm.
We used three GLMs to explain individual subject level time series with fixed
effects. All models incorporated only one event per trial, which was the onset of
picture display. We also tested models with boxcars over stimulus and
response epochs, which we do not detail here as they yielded similar results.
In the first model, trials were sorted according to the stimulus category (face,
house, or painting), with no parametric modulation. In the second model, trials
were sorted according to the task (age or pleasantness ratings), with the re-
corded rating as parametric modulation. In the third model, trials were sorted
according to whether the picture was preferred or not in the postscanner easy
comparison, with no parametric modulation. All regressors of interest were
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). To correct
for motion artifacts, subject-specific realignment parameters were modeled as
covariates of no interest.
Linear contrasts of regression coefficients were computed at the subject
level and then taken to a group level random effect analysis using a one-
sample t test. A conjunction analysis (Friston et al., 2005) was performed to
find brain regions activated in both pleasantness and preference contrasts.
Regions of interest (ROIs) were identified in statistical parametric maps
(SPMs) at a threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected) and selected as part of the
BVS if they contained more than 20 voxels. To further characterize the BVS,
we extracted regression coefficients (betas) within spheres of 8 mm in diam-
eter (corresponding to the FWHM of the Gaussian kernel used for spatial
smoothing) centered on the selected clusters maxima. Regression coefficients
were averaged within and between ROIs for each subject. Factors of interest
(stimulus category, rating task, delay, and difficulty level) and correlations with
ratings were tested for significance at the group level using paired t tests and
Pearson’s coefficients, as was done for the behavioral data.
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